Argentina was viewed as the least Americanized country in Latin America at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, the role U.S. companies in shaping the Argentinean economy in the first decades of the twentieth century has not yet been fully documented. For this reason, this article provides a new estimate of the scope and characteristics of U.S. interests in Argentina, and try to explain the role and impact of U.S. firms in Argentina's economic growth to 1930. It proposes that the impact of U.S. investments on the Argentinean economy was of longer standing and more widely diversified than has generally been assumed.
This data verifies two hypotheses: that there was a gradual, incremental increase in the number of newly settled companies during the first decades of the twentieth century (which cannot be measured in terms of the amount of direct investment) and that the U.S. stake in Argentina was early and remarkably diverse. The following sections, in chronological order, identify the main activities of U.S. companies in Argentina in each of the three phases previously identified.
U.S. Companies before World War I
Argentina was a vast country of fertile prairies, and it was swiftly included in global markets as a staple producer. Its successful economic performance during the first global economy was railways and ports-and services to export primary goods. Another characteristic of the Argentinean economic structure was the enormous volume of its foreign trade. The trade between the United States and Argentina developed slowly during the nineteenth century.
Continental Europe (50 percent) and Great Britain (35 percent) dominated imports at the beginning of the twentieth century. 11 In 1904, U.S. sales to Argentina made their first large jump. Agricultural implements accounted for the largest single increase, followed by wood and wood manufacturers. In 1905, the most important products were timber (in bulk), vehicles and railway material, and agricultural tools and machinery. Trade between the U.S. and Argentina reached a new peak in 1910, when the country received more than half-54 percent-of U.S.
exports to South America (by value) (U.S. Department of Commerce 1900-1920).
The United States had gained an unquestionably strong position as the supplier of certain products (machinery, petroleum, agricultural equipment, lumber, and barbed wire) before World War I. American exports grew remarkably while the U.S. stake in Argentina was minimal, as stated above. For example, of the total foreign investments in Argentina in 1913, it was estimated that about 53 percent was British, 27 percent French, 10 percent German, six percent Belgian, three percent Spanish, and about only one percent American. 12 Before 1910, trade was more important than the nationality of direct investment for the simple reason that half of the imported goods from the United States had a competitive advantage over similar imported European goods (McCrae, van Metre, and Eder 1931) . The other half of imports from 11 A contemporary study of commercial relations between the U.S. and Argentina, in Phelps (1938) . 12 By 1913, the stock of long-term private foreign investment reached half of the value of the total fixed capital stock. See United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America (1958) . For a general analysis of foreign investments in Argentina, see Barbero and Regalsky (2002) and Jorge (1971) .
the United States (pharmaceutical and chemical products, electrical machinery, textiles, iron and steel products, paper products, building materials, and tires and inner tubes, among others)
faced European competition, which helps to explain the importance of having several U.S.
distribution and selling organizations in Argentina to manage the substantial increase in imported U.S. goods at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The first U.S. firms that migrated to Argentina were insurance and credit reporting companies. (Motz 1916) . The strategy of organizing a sales branch implied a higher investment and risk than indirect representation (through commercial agents), but the drawbacks were outweighed by the improvement in distribution methods and after-sales services.
Before World War I, the best-known U.S. industrial investments were the meatpacking plants. The reason that U.S. companies migrated to Argentina was to continue the chilled-beef trade with the United Kingdom. There were two reasons for this. First, available domestic surplus was diminishing. Second, Argentine beef had become competitive because US production costs had risen and Argentina was able to produce good quality beef cattle more cheaply than any other country (White 1945; Wilkins 1970) . U.S. packers already faced competition in the British market: in 1905, the quantity of Argentine beef arriving in the United Kingdom exceeded that from the U.S. for the first time. Improvements to refrigeration techniques after 1900 enabled the export of chilled meat, a more perishable product. Argentina became the first country to export both frozen and chilled meat, and there were firms that handled both products (Perren 1978 ). As such, U.S. firms expanded Argentine chilled beef exports but by no means initiated these. Overall, these firms' migration to Argentina (and South America in general) was a Table 3 ). In that sense, the war accentuated and accelerated a development that would have occurred more gradually. This trend was accompanied by an increase in the number of registered foreign companies. Even if during the war the flows of direct investment almost ceased (by its value), an important number of U.S. companies still decided to start operating in Argentina.
During the early period, U.S. businesspeople had confronted in Argentina the inadequacy of its business infrastructure. For years, they had relied on British financial institutions, cable companies, and ships for banking transactions, communications, and transport, but World War I underscored the necessity of improving and developing their own business infrastructure. As a part of this process, U.S. bank branches began to be established during these years. The U.S. Until the passage of the Federal Reserve Act, American national banks were prohibited from establishing foreign branches and from making acceptances. See Phelps (1927) for an analysis of the foreign expansion of American banks. About the National City Bank of New York expansion, see Cleveland and Huertas (1985) and Wilkins (1974, 19-23) . Also see Mayer (1973, 60-76) . Hemisphere (up to 75 percent of exports headed to Latin America went to Argentina). All of 17 See also The Americas 1, no. 1 (1919, (12) (13) . According to Mayer (1973, 66) , the president of the United States Steel Corporation, James A. Farrel, wanted an American bank to finance him in Argentina. He asked Vanderlip to open the first National City Bank branch in Argentina, pledging the support of the giant steel trust in return. He also promised to obtain the deposits of International Harvester, Armour and Swift, in addition to those of his own company for the National City Bank. 
U.S. Companies during the 1920s: New Products and Services
A number of significant changes unfolded after World War I. As the Argentine domestic market expanded and diversified in a low political risk environment, it attracted more foreign direct investment. The U.S. took on the role of main supplier of external capital to Latin America formerly occupied by Europe, and by the end of the 1920s, the U.S. capital flows exceeded the British ones (Grosse 1989, 10) . The period after World War I marked the end of a FDI cycle that had focused on the exploitation of natural resources. New firms moved into the country, and the companies already installed there enlarged their facilities. As Lewis has pointed out, the increased foreign demand for American exports boosted the funds available for investment abroad. The result was a steady and rapid increase in America's foreign holdings. 20 The Department of Commerce at the end of 1924 estimated that the total of US investments in Argentina was 121 millions (Halsey and Butler 1925) . As a consequence, in the 1920s, the United States confirmed its supremacy in investment flows and trade (See Table 3 ). The shares commanded by these new products, along with fuels and machinery, explain why imports from the United States grew four times in the 1920s, while products coming from continental Europe failed to double their volume and imports from the United Kingdom increased by less than 40 percent (Jorge 1971; Caputo de Astelarra 1984) .
20 By 1929, the principal area in which American business enterprises invested funds was South America (followed by Canada and Europe). The three areas altogether account for roughly three-fourths of American private investment abroad. See Lewis (1938, 424) . British concern for the rising American share as Argentina's industrial supplier while the U.K. remained its leading commodity buyer heightened the business rivalry between both nations.
Nonetheless, regardless of the Anglo-American rivalry debate, at the end of the 1920s, in 18 out of 25 listed products imported to Argentina there was no real competition between the U.S. and Great Britain (McCrae, et. al. 1931 ). This situation was even recognized by the British government: "A good proportion of the trade of each country comprises goods in which the other cannot, for certain fundamental reasons effectively compete at the present time, such as in agricultural machinery, automobiles, petroleum products, lumber, hinder twine, newsprint, cinematograph films, oil." (Great Britain 1923, 20) . The U.S. had not only replaced European Foreign Investment, 1929 -1943 and 1947 (New York, 1976 and Halsey and Butler (1925 Table 4 ).
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It is difficult to quantify the amount of capital that foreign companies invested in Argentina but the role of U.S. companies in certain industries and products was highly significant. In addition, by the 1920s, the American businessman community had consolidated itself in Argentina with the active participation of American businessmen in the AmCham (around 80 per cent of total 23 Peterson (1964, 356) . For a specific analysis of the Anglo-U.S. trade rivalry in Argentina, see Gravil (1975 -1943 and 1947 (New York, Arno Press, 1976 Aires to manufacture elevators (Ferrer 1964, 205) .
Ford continued to dominate the Argentinean market during this period (60 percent of the 4,071 automobiles imported by Argentina in January 1925 were Fords, and 58 percent of the remainder were divided among four other U.S. companies) (Phoebus 1926, 19 (Brady 1923; Tewksbury 1929 ).
In patent medicines and medical specialties, U.S. expansion was notable, even though France accounted for 50 percent of the imports of prepared medicines by 1925 (Bergin 1927, 12 For example, General Electric Co. (GE Co.), in addition to organizing special departments for the sale of various classes of electrical devices and materials, established an industrial section that specialized in importing and selling machines and devices to be used in construction industry. Acting as representatives of U.S. companies, these multinationals were supplying their own products but also complementary goods. U.S. Shoe Machinery Co, which manufactured 28 U.S. investment in Africa, Asia, and Oceania altogether amounted to $72 million, whereas in Australia and New Zealand it reached $22 million. In Canada, the value of selling organizations was estimated at $37 million. In Europe the amount was $132 million (Dickens 1930, 23 (Beecroft 1917; Tewksbury 1929 ).
An essential factor in promoting more direct dealing between manufacturer and importer was the increase in sales of products that require service. For example, U.S. drug manufacturers developed their own sales organizations and advertising campaigns, which allowed them to obtain a better share of a market dominated by French companies (Great Britain 1930, 54) . By the late 1920s, when patterns of consumption were undergoing enormous change in Argentina, U.S. companies made a crucial contribution to this process. Generally speaking, there was a rise in consumer demand in a new environment permeated by local industrial growth and secularization and influenced by the rise of new business practices-such as advertising-that reshaped the market and the patterns of marketing (Rocchi 1998; 2006) .
High tariffs and taxation also stimulated industrial migration to Argentina, particularly for some items, although it should be noted that their impact was low until the Great Depression set in.
Prior to 1930, only some items were affected by local merchandise classifications, or higher tariffs on a product imported in packaged form than on the same product imported in bulk. For example, pharmaceutical companies imported certain items in bulk and packaged them within the market to avoid tariffs. Another case was the tariff advantages provided by the importation of unassembled products. At the late 1920s, the Argentine tariff provided for a 30 percent 30 The American Weekly 1, no. 3 (21 July 1923, 12 The process of company migration, as said before, was gradual. Although each case was unique, the settling of foreign companies followed a similar pattern. Most migrations began with indirect representation (through independent agents, commission houses, or a salaried export manager) followed by direct representation. The next step was opening branch sales offices and finally, in some cases, starting assembly manufacturing plants that first combined importation and in situ manufacturing and later specialized in manufacturing. When their business volume and profit grew, the large U.S.-based trading enterprises saw advantages in having their own foreign houses (United States Federal Trade Commission 1916; see also Wilkins 1970).
As they also did in other countries, U.S. concerns deliberately established sales and distribution agencies before they undertook assembly or manufacturing (Dunning 1998, 17) . For example, farm implement maker B. F. Avery & Sons used the services of a local importer for more than 30 years, and in 1911 it decided to improve the sale and services of its products and opened a branch house in Buenos Aires, establishing direct factory-to-consumer service in Argentina. It was particularly important for U.S. companies to adapt their products to meet the requirements 31 Although no tires were manufactured in Argentina before 1930, the relatively high duties and the increasing demand have made various tire companies considered establishing subsidiary factories. In 1931 the Firestone Tire & Rubber Co was opened with a capacity of 1000 tires and rubbers per day. On changing tariffs and the implications for manufacturing firms, see Lewis (1987) . See also Phelps (1939, 67 The U.S. experience in Argentina conforms to the normally accepted progression of selling:
first agents, then sales branches, then secondary assembly/manufacturing, and that manufacturing activities included different methods. By 1930, however, full local manufacturing by U.S. firms was far from complete and few companies had achieved complete production, since practically all companies produced parts or changed the form of the product in some manner. Most firms had not moved far beyond secondary manufacture, and they were focused principally on packing, assembly, and service for products, without risking the resources needed for a complete production facility.
To sum up, the steady expansion of U.S. business interests may be attributed to international conditions, the growth of Argentinean consumers' purchasing power as well as their ready acceptance of "new products." The internal market attractiveness and political and opportunity parameters contributed to Argentina's attractiveness. Both the national and local government policies were very favorable to foreign investors. In addition, the expanding economy and the demand for required industrial and commercial investment services attracted entrepreneurial initiatives in the banking, transport, insurance, and advertising sectors, among others. U.S. firms in service sectors established units in the region to hold the loyalty of their domestic customers.
Inducements to invest were diverse, and included the multiplier effect of multinational expansion (acting as a driving force) and a desire to expand into South America generally, using
Argentinean subsidiaries as staging areas. Another distinctive characteristic of U.S.-based companies settling in Argentina, as compared to those moving into other Latin American countries, was that they ran a large number of operations, excluding land and agricultural sectors (as shown in Table 4 ). Indeed, within the scope of American firms' worldwide foreign investment strategy, Argentina was not fully involved in "supply-oriented strategies," as were the majority of other Latin American countries, with the major exception of meat-packing plants. (Chandler 1977; 1990) . U.S. firms had not only replaced European producers in some areas of the Argentine market but also created a demand for new goods. These companies helped diversify the domestic market's structure, particularly as a result of their new techniques in distribution, marketing, and advertising. They also contributed to innovation processes in the early stages of Argentina's industrialization. However, their impact would be more limited than in other countries, as full manufacturing by U.S. firms was far from complete by 1930.
At the same time, the penetration of U.S. firms brought some negative effects for the Argentine economy. The United States' involvement in nontraditional business sectors created new forms of dependence through machinery and assembly part imports. After World War I, Argentina imported fewer consumer goods and more durable goods and machinery. This trend clearly favored U.S. manufacturers. Conversely, the non-complementary nature of the two economies as well as U.S. tariff policies reducing raw-material imports and establishing sanitary embargoes restricted Argentina's purchasing power. 33 The result was a trade imbalance that grew continuously (except during World War I) and peaked in 1929, after being partly mitigated in the 1920s by the net inflow of U.S. capital (Table 4) . Nonetheless, while those dollar investments made the U.S. the single most important foreign influence on Argentina's economy, they increased Argentine commercial deficits with the United States, since U.S.
direct investment increased imports. The structural trade imbalance between Argentina and the United States was correlated in part with the trade behavior of U.S. multinationals. 34 A complex scenario characterized U.S.-Argentine trade relations in the late 1920s, although until then U.S.
firms had been able to take advantage of Argentina's economic openness and successful integration to the global economy.
